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Use Restrictions and the Retention of
Property Interests in Chattels Through
Intellectual Property Rights
Granting intellectual property rights promotes invention but
also encourages wasteful expenditures to avoid monopoly prices.
If patent or copyright owners are allowed to place some types of
restrictions on the products they sell, these wasteful efforts can be
avoided. This Comment discusses restrictions that have this effect
and how intellectual property law might best create a doctrine en-
forcing them.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution grants Congress the authority to
"promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."' Considerable debate ex-
ists concerning the wisdom of granting exclusive rights to authors
and inventors,2 but most modern commentary is supportive of the
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. For a historical review, see Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Contro-
versy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. EcON. HisT. 1 (1950). Many arguments concern
the issues of whether the intellectual property grant is effective in increasing the amount
of invention, whether too many resources are expended on invention, and whether the
interference with free market access to invention outweighs the benefits of its increased
creation. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copy-
right in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281 (1970);
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statutory grant. However, intellectual property grants are imperfect
instruments. Granting monopoly rights in innovation motivates inno-
vators, increasing the overall production of creative work.3 But, prod-
ucts such as books or machine tools that incorporate protected
expression or invention are sold at a higher price because the innova-
tor hopes to realize the available profits from his/her monopoly and
earn a return for the costs of creation.4 This monopoly pricing
reduces the total volume of sales,5 thereby preventing normal distri-
bution and availability of the creation. Intellectual property law uses
several means to minimize these inefficiencies. One method is limit-
ing the duration of the grant. Another method is careful definition of
what is patentable or copyrightable.6 A third method regulates ex-
press restrictions on use, imposed directly by the intellectual prop-
erty owner, on the articles which incorporate protected invention or
expression. This third method is the subject of this Comment.
Use restrictions attempted by intellectual property owners can be
grouped broadly into the following four types: 1) resale price restric-
tions,7 2) tying arrangements," 3) restrictions on use to certain types
Roger E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or
Monopoly?, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 911 (1990). Some arguments take issue with
the philosophy of intellectual property and its relation to individual freedom. See, e.g.,
Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of
Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817 (1990).
3. Courts have long accepted motivation of creativity as the foundation of the
grant. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 322 (1859); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829).
4. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 38-40 (4th
ed. 1992).
5. See id. at 271-81; William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on the Exploitation of
the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966).
6. The limitations on the duration of statutory protection and types of protected
works are often explained on the basis of their effect on the amount of investment in
inventive activity, rather than their effect on the use of invention after its production, See
POSNER, supra note 4, at 40; Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent
Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305 (1992).
7. A resale price restriction requires the owner of a patented or copyrighted prod-
uct to sell only, if at all, in some limited price range. The attempted restriction is usually
to a minimum resale price. See, e.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
8. Tying restrictions typically require the owner of a patented or copyrighted prod-
uct to use it only in conjunction with another product also provided by the patent or
copyright holder. For instance, a patented wrench may be restricted to tightening certain
brands of nuts and bolts, or a theater may be required to sell a particular popcorn when
showing a copyrighted film. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
The Supreme Court has defined a tying arrangement somewhat more broadly, as "an
agreement by a party to sell one product [the tying product] but only on the condition
that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will
not purchase that product from any other supplier." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
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or fields, 9 and 4) restrictions on the duration or number of uses.10
The first three types have a long history in the case law, and these
types of restrictions have received detailed comment."
By definition, legal enforcement of post sale restrictions would cre-
ate direct limitations on the distribution and use of invention. This
would be especially true of restrictions enforceable against all future
owners of the item, in a manner similar to real property easements.
Because of these use-inhibiting effects, one might suppose that use
restrictions would be acceptable only when absolutely required to
maintain the monopoly that motivates the initial creation. Contrary
to intuition, however, some use restrictions, especially when enforce-
able against subsequent purchasers, can actually reduce the market
distortions and inefficient use of creation that accompany the intel-
lectual property grant.
Part I of this Comment introduces a conceptual model of how con-
tracts can create use restrictions that bind subsequent purchasers.
Part II illustrates the most recent judicial treatment of patent-and-
copyright-enforced use restrictions with two cases, Mallinckrodt v.
Medipart,"2 a patent case involving a "single-use-only" restriction on
a medical device, and Independent News Co. v. Williams,"3 a copy-
right case involving a prohibition on the resale of comic books that
had been purchased as wastepaper. Part III reviews the precedent
existing prior to Mallinckrodt and Independent News, precedent
which is generally hostile to patent-and-copyright-enforced use re-
strictions, although exceptions exist. Part IV presents ways in which
the enforcement of restrictions may be the best doctrine because
some use restrictions are consistent with the goal of minimizing the
market distortions that the intellectual property grant creates. Part
9. A field of use restriction requires the owner of a patented or copyrighted prod-
uct to use it for particular types of activities. For example, a patented wrench could be
restricted to use only in assembling airplanes or prohibited from being used to assemble
cars. A copyrighted film could be restricted to showings in theaters seating less than 50
people, or prohibited from being shown on television. The activities are typically segre-
gated based on the value of the patented or copyrighted product for the particular use.
See, e.g., General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), affid on
reh'g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
10. A duration restriction requires the owner of a patented or copyrighted product
to dispose of or otherwise stop using the article after a certain period of time or number
of uses. See, e.g., American Cotton Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882) (holding
single use restriction invalid).
11. See infra notes 46-77 and accompanying text.
12. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992), rev'g 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1113 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
13. 293 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1961).
V also presents ways in which the enforcement of use restrictions can
be effectively included into intellectual property doctrine.
I. A MODEL OF SERVITUDE CREATION
The term "use restriction" refers to an enforceable obligation on
the part of an owner of an item to use it in a particular way. Con-
tracts creating use restrictions are common in the real property con-
text. For example, neighbors may contract concerning a limitation
on the type or placement of structures that may be erected on their
respective properties.' 4 Other use restrictions require no contract for
their existence. For instance, the real property doctrine of nuisance
prohibits one from opening a beef slaughterhouse in the middle of a
residential neighborhood, even without a contract with the neighbors
agreeing not to do so."'
Borrowing the real property concept of the "equitable servitude,"
this Comment uses the term "servitude" to refer to a use restriction
that binds future owners of the restricted item, even if those future
owners are not party to a contract creating the restriction. Use re-
strictions that are independent of contractual agreements are always
servitudes. The use restrictions created by nuisance law, for example,
are enforceable against all future owners of the property at issue.'8
Use restrictions created by contract, however, need not also be servi-
tudes. If a piece of property passes to another owner, the new owner
is not necessarily bound by the contractual obligations of the prior
owner.1
The use restriction/servitude distinction is important because ser-
vitudes create obligations on parties who have not entered into con-
tracts creating them. Thus it is possible for a servitude to be
enforced against a real property owner who had no knowledge of the
servitude at the time of purchase. 8 Though a voluntary transaction
is thought to be economically efficient because presumably the par-
ties would not have entered into it otherwise, a servitude needs spe-
cial justification because this presumption cannot be made.
Additional reasons for enforcement, reasons that overcome the fact
14. There is no doubt that land owners can bind themselves with contracts con-
cerning the use of their land. The difficult problem is in determining when those contrac-
tual obligations are binding on a subsequent owner of that land. See 5 RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY §§ 522-568 (1944).
15. The use restrictions imposed by nuisance law are not contractual in nature
because the creation of a nuisance is a tort. 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 822-831 (1979).
16. See supra, note 15. Since nuisance is a tort doctrine, any owner of the land, no
matter how it was acquired, will be subject to civil liability for nuisance creation.
17. See supra, note 14.
18. See, e.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925); 5 RICH-
ARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 672 (Patrick J. Rohan rev. ed. 1993).
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that the defendant never contracted into an obligation, must be pre-
sent. Consequently, only special types of contracts create servitudes.
A conceptual framework for the creation of servitudes on products
incorporating protected intellectual property can be constructed as
follows. The patent and copyright grants confer, by statute, certain
exclusive rights to the grantee. When an intellectual property owner
sells an article incorporating the protected invention or expression,
some of these exclusive rights pass to the purchaser of the product,
and some of them are retained by the patent or copyright owner. For
example, the purchaser of a copyrighted book does not have the right
to make copies of the book.19 This right is retained by the copyright
owner. Similarly, the purchaser of a patented tool does not buy the
right to reconstruct it if destroyed by some accident.20 To retain
these two rights, the intellectual property owner need not place a
label on the item explaining that copying or reconstruction is prohib-
ited, or that such actions will be considered copyright or patent
infringement.
As the cases discussed below illustrate, however, intellectual prop-
erty owners are not always satisfied with the "default" distribution
of rights, defined by the terms of the statutes. It is not uncommon
for a patent or copyright owner to want greater control over the fu-
ture disposition of the item. Restrictions that reallocate rights away
from the default distribution require a contract for their creation. If
the intellectual property owner wishes to bind future owners of the
item as well, a contract right is insufficient: the patent or copyright
holder must retain a property right in the sold article. If the contract
is effective in preventing a property right in the article from passing
to the purchaser, then it may become a servitude, potentially binding
future owners of the item who may not have contracted with anyone
concerning the restriction. To give future parties in possession of the
article "notice" of the retained property right, some type of labeling
might be used.2 There are, therefore, two issues to be decided.
19. This namesake of copyright law is contained in 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1988).
20. The limitation on the right to rebuild or reconstruct patented items is discussed
at length in Aro Mfg. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) and
American Cotton Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882). See infra notes 78-88 and
accompanying discussion.
21. All of the cases discussed in this Comment involve restrictive language placed
on the patented or copyrighted product by a label or inscription. The marking is an effort
to ensure that future owners of the item have notice of the restriction, a crucial element
in the creation of a servitude. The form of the statement, and its effectiveness in im-
parting notice, is a subject which has received little attention in the cases dealing with
this issue. Usually, "actual notice" of the restriction is assumed, and the debate focuses
The first is whether the initial contract successfully retained a
property interest in the article that would otherwise have passed to
the buyer. The second is whether the subsequent owner had sufficient
notice of its existence to be bound by its terms. Judicial treatment of
these two issues is illustrated in the following Part.
II. MALLINCKRODT AND INDEPENDENT NEWS
An example of servitude enforcement is provided by the 1992 fed-
eral circuit decision in Mallinckrodt v. Medipart.22 The plaintiff in
the case, Mallinckrodt Inc., sold a medical device known as the Ul-
traVent, used to deliver radioactive or therapeutic aerosol mist into
the lungs. Each unit, covered by five patents concerning various as-
pects of the device, was marked with the inscription "Single Use
Only," and was provided with detailed instructions for proper dispo-
sal . 3 Instead of following the disposal instructions, many hospitals
sent used UltraVents to the defendant, Medipart. Medipart would
recondition them by gamma radiation sterilization and the replace-
ment of miscellaneous accessories (not covered by patents) such as
nose clips and plastic tubing, and return them to the hospital.
Mallinckrodt filed suit to enjoin further "reconditioning" by
Medipart, arguing that the single-use-only inscription was a limited
license to use the patented invention. Overruling a thoughtful district
court opinion, the Mallinckrodt court held that the inscription, if a
"valid condition of sale" and if "within the scope of the patent grant
or otherwise justified," was effective to limit the use rights of the
UltraVent purchaser. 4 In reaching this conclusion, the Mallinckrodt
court construed prior case law narrowly, noting that all cases previ-
ously denying the validity of use restrictions after sale involved price
fixing or tying arrangements.25
The two fundamental issues in servitude litigation, contractual va-
lidity of the restriction and notice to the subsequent purchaser, are
clearly the issues the court considered important. Their treatment in
the court's opinion, however, is rather muddled.
on whether the property right is retainable in principle by the intellectual property
owner.
Whether it is possible for the user of a patented or copyrighted article to be held to
have "constructive" notice of a restriction placed on a label (as opposed to having "ac-
tual" notice) has apparently never been addressed in litigation.
22. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
23. Id. at 702. Because the UltraVent can be radioactive and infectious after use,
proper disposal procedures are important.
24. Id. at 709.
25. Id. at 704. Due to the lack of factually similar precedent, the district court
opinion relied on expansive language in the price fixing and tying cases. 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1117. In reversing, the appellate court stated that they "do not favor this
practice." 976 F.2d at n. 8. See infra Part III for a detailed discussion of the price fixing
and tying cases cited in both opinions.
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The court based its decision on the fact that "[t]he movant
Medipart did not dispute notice of the restriction. ' 26 The "notice"
requirement makes sense as applied to Medipart, because to be held
liable as an infringer of a limited-use license, Medipart must be
bound by the terms of a sales and license contract that it is not a
party to. This is similar to real property doctrines under which the
purchaser of a tract of land can be bound by provisions contained in
a prior contract he had no part in if he had notice of a contractual
agreement concerning the land.
The court also stated that "[t]he UltraVent device was manufac-
tured by the patentee; but the sale to the hospitals was the first sale
and was with notice of the restriction. '28 The court apparently used
the concept of notice to justify the contractual validity of the restric-
tion. 9 The court's statement is also confusing because the outcome
of the case requires a subsequent purchaser (Medipart) to live up to
the terms of the hospital's sale contract. There is no reason why it
should matter that the sale to the hospitals was the first sale.
The Mallinckrodt court stated its holding as follows:
If the sale of the UltraVent was validly conditioned under the applicable
law such as the law governing sales and licenses, and if the restriction on
reuse was within the scope of the patent grant or otherwise justified, then
violation of the restriction may be remedied by action for patent
infringement.30
This statement is directed entirely at the initial purchaser. It does
not explain why the circumstances justify binding Medipart, who
was not a party to this validly-conditioned-sale contract.
If Medipart's actions are considered only inducement to infringe,
rather than actual infringement, 3' it is possible to interpret the Mal-
linckrodt holding without reference to servitudes. One fact recog-
nized at both the district and appellate level was that after
reconditioning, Medipart returned the units to the same hospital that
sent them out.32 The second use of the same unit, if originally pur-
chased under a validly conditioned sale, would be infringement by
26. 976 F.2d at 701.
27. See supra, note 18.
28. 976 F.2d at 705.
29. In passing, the court cited § 2-207(2)(c) of the Uniform Commercial Code in
support of its proposition that the inscription on the device could become a binding part
of the sale contract. Id. at n.7.
30. Id. at 709.
31. Medipart was being sued for both infringement and inducement to infringe. Id.
at 701.
32. 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114; 976 F.2d at 701.
the hospital, an infringement to which Medipart contributed. While
this may be a possible reading of the court's language, the reach of
the Mallinckrodt holding is very limited if the result of the case
rests on the fact that the hospital received from Medipart the same
UltraVents they originally purchased. If the original hospital sold
used UltraVents to a second hospital, who then contracted for the
reconditioning, Mallinckrodt would have had no basis for an in-
fringement action without resorting to servitudes and ideas of notice.
The same would be true if Medipart bought used units outright from
hospitals, reconditioned them, and then resold them to different hos-
pitals. The second use could not be considered infringement unless
the second hospital is bound by the validly-conditioned-sale contract
entered into by the first hospital due to notice of the license
condition.33
Both the district and appellate court opinions touch on steriliza-
tion and infection concerns, as Mallinckrodt justified its restriction
on the grounds that it was based on health, safety, efficacy, and lia-
bility considerations. The district court called these factors "irrele-
vant to the question of infringement." '34 The circuit court, citing the
decision in Marks v. Polaroid,35 noted that safety concerns have
been found sufficient to defend a single-use restriction against allega-
tions of patent misuse. The absence of patent misuse, however, only
establishes that a single-use restriction is enforceable as a license
contract. The Mallinckrodt opinion does not take the next step, at
least not explicitly, and explain why the restriction should become a
servitude, binding future owners of the product who are not party to
a license contract with the patentee. 6
Rather than restrict the repair of an otherwise unusable patented
product, the attempted servitude in Independent News Co. v. Wil-
lams37 forced the destruction of an otherwise useable copyrighted
product. In Independent News, the plaintiffs published, distributed,
and owned copyrights over certain comic books. They sold the comic
books to wholesalers, who in turn sold them to retail outlets, where
33. That is, unless the terms of the original sale contract have become a servitude
on the UltraVent.
34. Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121.
35. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708-709. In Marks v. Polaroid, the plaintiff patent
holder manufactured 3-D viewing glasses for movie theaters. After each use, the theater
owner was required to throw the used glasses away. Polaroid justified this restriction in
part on the possible transmission of eye infections with multiple use. The court found
that the license restriction did not constitute patent misuse. Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 237
F.2d 428, 436-437 (lst Cir. 1956).
36. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of how health
and safety concerns can be relevant to infringement and can justify this type of restric-
tion as a servitude.
37. 293 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1961).
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they were sold to consumers for a limited time specified by the pub-
lisher. After this period, the retailer returned unsold comics to the
wholesaler for full credit. The wholesaler could then return the same
unsold comics to the publisher, also for full credit. Another option
for the wholesaler was to return only the front cover to receive full
credit. As for the rest of the comic, the wholesaler was under con-
tract to
destroy or mutilate the remaining portions thereof so as to render them
unsalable as publications .... [S]uch destroyed or mutilated portions of
return copies shall be disposed of or sold for no other purpose than waste
paper, and. . . a written commitment [will be obtained] from the purchas-
ers of such destroyed or mutilated return copies that the same will be used
only for waste and will not be resold.38
In addition, each of the comics contained a notice reading:
This periodical may not be sold except by authorized dealers and is sold
subject to the conditions that it shall not be sold or distributed with any
part of its cover or markings removed, nor in a mutilated condition, nor
affixed to, nor as part of any advertising, literary, or pictorial matter
whatsoever.39
The defendant was a secondhand book and magazine dealer, who
had purchased comics with removed covers from a wastepaper
dealer. The defendant was selling the comic books, and plaintiffs
sued to enjoin under several theories, including copyright infringe-
ment.40 Finding that unrestricted title to the comics had passed to
both the wastepaper dealers and the defendant, the court refused to
prevent defendant's continued sales of the comics. 4 '
In contrast to Mallinckrodt, the Independent News opinion clearly
distinguishes between the rights and obligations of parties to a use-
restricting-license contract, and the rights and obligations of subse-
quent purchasers of the copyrighted work originally licensed.
"[W]here the publisher has parted with the title to the copyrighted
38. Id. at 512.
39. Id. at 517-18.
40. The other theories were conversion, trademark infringement, unfair competi-
tion, and invasion of the right of privacy. Id. passim.
41. Although the contract between the copyright holder and the wholesaler explic-
itly reserved title to the coverless comics in the copyright holder "until the same are so
destroyed or mutilated as to be unusable for any purpose except waste," the court found
the wastepaper dealers to be buyers in the ordinary course of business, capable of trans-
ferring title under § 2-403(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 511-14. The
court assumed that the wastepaper dealers had no notice of the contractual provisions
reserving title or requiring destruction of the comics. Id. at 512-14. The copyright in-
fringement action was then dismissed because "once there is lawful ownership trans-
ferred to a first purchaser, the copyright holder's power of control in the sale of the copy
ceases." Id. at 517.
work and despite the fact that as between the immediate parties
there is a contractual restriction on its use, this restriction does not
bar subsequent purchasers from vending the periodical as a literary
work free of the restriction. 42 The court held this to be the rule
"irrespective of whether the defendant had notice of the original con-
tractual restriction."4 3
In spite of this lack of legal support for the scheme, the retailer
credit and disposal procedures of the Independent News case are still
common." The industry has apparently accepted the observation of
the district court in Independent News, which stated that "[w]e rec-
ognize the plaintiff's desire to have return copies destroyed as a per-
fectly legitimate goal. But if plaintiffs are to accomplish this goal it
will have to be without our assistance.145
Given the different outcomes in Mallinckrodt and Independent
News, it is somewhat surprising that the patent and copyright prece-
dent leading to both decisions is similar. This precedent is discussed
in the following Part.
III. TYING, PRICE FIXING, FIELD-OF-USE, AND DURATION
RESTRICTIONS
As described in Part I, patent and copyright holder's attempts at
creating servitudes fall into four general types, tying, resale price
fixing, field-of-use restrictions, and limitations on duration of use.
A. Tying Restriction Cases
An example of judicial treatment of patent-enforced tying restric-
tions is provided by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Manufacturing Co.41 In this case, the plaintiff, owner of patents in-
corporated in movie projectors, licensed a manufacturer to make and
sell projectors incorporating the patented invention, if all projectors
were sold with the condition that only certain types of films would be
42. Id. at 516-17.
43. Id. at 516.
44. Paperback novels published by Random House contain this statement:
Sale of this book without a front cover may be unauthorized. If this book is
coverless, it may have been reported to the publisher as "unsold or destroyed"
and neither the author nor the publisher may have received payment for it.
Dell Publishing uses a slightly different form:
If you purchased this book without a cover you should be aware that this book
is stolen property. It was reported as "unsold and destroyed" to the publisher
and neither the author nor the publisher has received any payment for this
"stripped book".
Note that the statements appeal to the conscience of the buyer, rather than threatening
the seller with an infringement suit.
45. Independent News Co. v. Williams, 184 F.Supp. 877, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
46. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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used with the projector." The manufacturing licensee was also re-
quired to affix a label to the projectors, stating the terms of the use
restriction. 8 The Supreme Court found the use restriction invalid,
holding that the right to restrict what types of other products are
used with a patented device is not part of the patent grant.49 The
same conclusion on the enforceability of tying restrictions, stated
with similar language, has been reached in copyright cases.50
B. Resale Price Restriction (Price Fixing) Cases
Resale price restrictions have also been attempted, with little suc-
cess. One example is a case involving a resale price restriction on a
novel. In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,5 the plaintiff owned the
copyright to a novel, and had printed inside, next to the copyright
notice, the following statement:
The price of this book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell
47. The required films incorporated patents which the plaintiff also owned, and
were available only through the plaintiff. Id. at 506.
48. The text of the label stated:
The sale and purchase of this machine gives only the right to use it solely with
moving pictures containing the invention of reissued patent No. 12,192, leased
by a licensee of the Motion Picture Patents Company, the owner of the above
patents and reissued patent, while it owns said patents, and upon other terms to
be fixed by the Motion Picture Patents Company and complied with by the
user while it is in use and while the Motion Picture Patents Company owns
said patents. The removal or defacement of this plate terminates the right to
use this machine.
Id. at 506-507.
49. The Court stated:
[I]t is not competent for the owner of a patent by notice attached to its ma-
chine, to, in effect, extend the scope of its patent monopoly by restricting the
use of it to materials necessary in its operation, but which are no part of the
patented invention, or to send its machines forth into the channels of trade of
the country subject to conditions as to use or royalty to be paid, to be imposed
thereafter at the discretion of such patent owner.
Id. at 516. See also Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (involv-
ing tying the use of particular salt tablets to the use of patented salt depositing ma-
chines). Morton Salt characterized this type of restriction as "use of the patent to secure
an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office." Id. at 492.
50. In Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug Inc. 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 17
(E.D. Penn. 1964), the owner of copyrights in musical compositions licensed the works to
a distributor to be sold only on long playing records in connection with the promotion
and sale of a certain shampoo. The defendant retail store bought copies of the records
with the shampoo from the distributor and then sold the two separately. The court
stated: "The fact that defendants knew of the restrictions which were part of the license
agreement between plaintiff and Beecham [the distributor] neither binds defendants to a
contract to which they were not parties nor widens the scope of control granted by the
Copyright Act." Id. at 19.
51. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement
of the copyright.
5 2
The defendants had purchased copies of the novel from wholesale
dealers, who had purchased from either the plaintiff directly or from
other wholesalers, and were selling the novel for less than the re-
quired one dollar. Both the defendant and the wholesalers were
aware of the statement printed in the book, but neither was under
any contractual agreement with Bobbs-Merrill concerning resale
prices.53 The narrow issue, according to the Court, was whether or
not "the sole right to vend [provided by copyright statute] . ..se-
cure[s] to the owner of the copyright the right, after a sale of the
book to a purchaser, to restrict future sales of the book at retail...
because of a notice in the book. ' '5 4 The Court answered that question
in the negative, refusing to enjoin the Straus brothers from selling
the book at a discounted price. The Court stated:
To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to control all future retail
sales, by a notice that such sales must be made at a fixed sum, would give a
right not included in the terms of the statute, and, in our view, extend its
operation, by construction, beyond its meaning .... 11
The leading resale price restriction cases in the patent regime are
the Bauer trilogy. 56 In each of these cases, patentees attempted to
impose resale price restrictions by attaching labels or notices to the
articles stating the patentee's resale restriction. Finding that the pat-
ent grant does not include the right to impose resale price restric-
tions on sold articles, each court refused to enforce the condition."
However, sale price restrictions imposed on manufacturing licensees
of patented products, rather than purchasers, have been upheldY8
Although the tying and price fixing cases involved label notices,
52. Id. at 341.
53. Id. at 342.
54. Id. at 350.
55. Id. at 351.
56. Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918);
Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917); Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell,
229 U.S. 1 (1913).
57. 246 U.S. at 25; 243 U.S. at 501; 229 U.S. at 17.
58. United States v. General Electric Co. 272 U.S. 476 (1926). In this case, the
Court, while stating that "where a patentee makes the patented article, and sells it, he
can exercise no future control over what the purchaser may wish to do with the article,"
Id. at 489, nevertheless held that sale price restrictions as part of a manufacturing li-
cense contract are valid. Id. at 493. But cf. United States v. Univis Lens Co. 316 U.S.
241 (1942). In Univis, the Court distinguished General Electric and held that the finisher
of lens blanks into eyeglass lenses was not a manufacturing licensee of patented eyeglass
lenses but was a purchaser of patented lens blanks. The Univis opinion uses very broad
language in discussing use restrictions:
His [the patentee's] monopoly remains so long as he retains the ownership of
the patented article. But sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article and
the patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or
disposition of the article.
Id. at 250.
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courts have disposed of these cases by holding that the statutory
grant does not include the right to control sold articles in those ways.
If the grant does not create that property right in the first place, it
cannot be retained by the patentee or copyright owner. The deci-
sions, do not, therefore, reach the issue of notice. 59
C. Field-of-Use Restriction Cases
A field-of-use restriction was at issue in General Talking Pictures
Corp. v. Western Electric.0 In that case the plaintiff owned a patent
on a particular design for vacuum tube amplifiers. 61 The plaintiff
had licensed the American Transformer Co. to manufacture and sell
tubes incorporating the patented design "only for radio amateur re-
ception, radio experimental reception and radio broadcast recep-
tion. ' 62 The patentee retained for itself the right to sell into the
commercial field, comprising, among other applications, "talking pic-
ture equipment for theaters. ' 3 Part of the agreement between the
patent owner and the licensee American Transformer Co. was that
American was to affix a label to each tube manufactured stating that
one of the conditions of sale under which the tube was made was
that the device was only to be used in amateur radio reception. The
defendant, with knowledge of the license restriction, bought vacuum
tubes from American Transformer with the intent to use them com-
mercially in theaters. American Transformer Co. was aware of this
intention when the tubes were sold.6 4 Western Electric sued, and the
circuit court issued an injuction preventing General Talking Pictures
from using the tubes they had purchased. This decision was affirmed
59. Although judicial opinion is solidly opposed to both price fixing and tying, a
doctrine the Mallinckrodt court indicated no intention to change, commentators have
found reasons for enforcing both under some conditions. See generally Henry N. Butler
& W.J. Lane et al., The Futility of Antitrust Attacks on Tie-In Sales: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 173 (1984); John E. Lopatka, The Case for Legal
Enforcement of Price Fixing Agreements, 38 EMORY L.J. 1 (1989); Keith K. Wol-
lenberg, An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales: Re-examining the Leverage Theory, 39
STAN. L. REV. 737 (1987).
60. 304 U.S. 175 (1938), affid on reh'g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
61. Id. at 176.
62. Id. at 181.
63. Id. at 179. As a license contract matter, the Court held it to be established
that the right to license only a portion of the exclusive right to sell, such as the right to
sell only in a geographic area, or only into one market, is a valid practice. Id. at 181. The
question before the Court was whether or not this valid manufacturing license contract
could become a servitude on the products produced under it. Id. at 177.
64. Id. at 180.
by the Supreme Court.6 5 The General Talking Pictures court held
that because the defendant (and American Transformer Co.) knew
that the licensee had no authority to make the tubes for that particu-
lar use in the first place, no valid sale ever occurred: "The Trans-
former Co. could not convey to petitioner what both knew it was not
authorized to sell."' 66 That the label notice was not a basis for the
decision was made clear by the Court.67 By not relying on the label,
General Talking Pictures avoided declaring servitude creation valid,
although that is the practical effect of the holding.
A field-of-use servitude was enforced at the district court level in
1965. In Chemagro Corp. v. Universal Chemical Co.,6 the plaintiff
was an exclusive licensee under a patent related to insecticide. 9
Chemagro sold insecticide in both a 10% and 2% concentration;
10% for professional agriculture, 2% for the home gardener. They
also placed a label on the 10% concentration stating that the license
to use the 10% product was conditioned on not diluting it and resel-
ling it into the home market. One defendant, The Ferti-Lome Peo-
ple, was in the business of selling home gardening products,
including chemicals manufactured by the other defendants, Univer-
sal Chemical Co. The Ferti-Lome People sold 2% insecticide origi-
nally sold to the other defendants in the 10% concentration.70 The
Chemagro court, relying on General Talking Pictures, upheld the
use restriction, stating:
A patent owner or licensee thereof can, by a limited patent license in the
form of a written label notice attached to a product made under the patent
and sold in the ordinary channels of trade, place an enforceable restriction
on the purchaser thereof as to the use to which the purchaser may put the
product if said purchaser had actual notice of said limited patent license.71
In its wholehearted support of servitudes, the Chemagro opinion con-
tains no analysis of the Supreme Court language in the price fixing
and tying cases discussed above.7 2
Copyright owner's attempts at field-of-use servitude creation are
rare, but one example is Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station.,3
65. Id. at 183.
66. Id. at 181.
67. "[P]etitioner's second question, as to effect of the license notice, need not be
considered." Id. at 182.
68. 244 F.Supp. 486 (E.D. Tex. 1965).
69. They were also granted the right to sue in their own name. Id. at 488.
70. Id. at 489.
71. Id. Although the facts and holding of the General Talking Pictures case are
consistent with this statement, the language of the opinion expressly states that this con-
clusion was not reached. Chemagro takes the step that General Talking Pictures did not,
and expressly relies on servitude creation. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
72. The Mallinckrodt district court refused to follow this opinion, saying that
"[g]iven both the lack of analysis in Chemagro and the policy reasons discussed before,
Chemagro is not persuasive." Mallinckrodt, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
73. 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937).
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In Waring, the plaintiff was the conductor of Fred Waring's Penn-
sylvanians, a successful orchestra that played mostly live perform-
ances, but that also had a contract to play for radio broadcast one
night a week. When the orchestra began recording its music, the
plaintiff, concerned about retaining the radio play market, arranged
for the statement "Not licensed for radio broadcast" to be placed on
the records.74 The defendant owned a radio station, had purchased a
recording of the plaintiffs orchestra, and had also obtained a license
to the copyrighted music 5 from the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers. After the defendant played the records on
the radio, Waring sued for an injunction.7 6 Finding phonograph play
and radio play to be "so radically distinct as to belong to two totally
different fields of operation," the court enjoined further radio broad-
cast of the record.77
D. Duration Restriction Cases
An attempted duration restriction was at issue in another case.718
In Cotton Tie, the American Cotton Tie Company sold metal ties for
cotton bales. The ties were patented, and the buckle was stamped
with the statement "Licensed to use once only."' 79 The ties needed to
be cut when removed from cotton bales, and the defendant was in
the business of buying scrap cut ties, straightening them, riveting
them back together, and reselling them for additional use. American
74. Id. at 632-633. At the time, musical recordings were not covered by the copy-
right statutes. The issue in this case was whether or not the use restriction on the label
enabled the copyright owner to retain a portion of his common law property interest in
the music.
75. In written, musical notation form.
76. 194 A. at 633.
77. An injunction was denied under nearly identical facts in RCA Mfg. v. White-
man 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), revg 28 F.Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). The Waring
court considered that "modern conditions of commerce and industry and the nature of
new scientific inventions make restrictions highly desirable." Waring, 194 A. at 637. The
RCA court, speaking through Judge Learned Hand, disagreed, stating that
"[riestrictions upon the uses of chattels once absolutely sold are at least prima facie
invalid . . . normally they are 'repugnant' to the transfer of title." RCA, 114 F.2d at 89.
Finding no significant factual distinction with Waring, the RCA court remained "uncon-
vinced," after giving "the most respectful consideration to the conclusions of that great
court." Id.
78. American Cotton Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882).
79. Id. at 91.
Cotton Tie brought an infringement action, but the suit was dis-
missed by the circuit court on the ground that the attempted restric-
tion to single-use was beyond the limits of the patent grant."0 The
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the defendant's actions were an
infringement.8 The Cotton Tie Court characterized the defendant's
actions as reconstruction rather than repair.82 "Whatever right the
defendants could acquire to the use of the old buckle [on which was
printed the restrictive notice], they acquired no right to combine it
with a substantially new band, to make a cotton bale tie. . . [a]s a
tie the defendants reconstructed it, although they used the old
buckle, without repairing that.183 The court continued, "We do not
decide that they are liable as infringers of either of the three patents,
merely because they have sold the buckle considered apart from the
band or from the entire structure as a tie."184
It is not clear whether the stamped restriction was any part of the
grounds for the decision.85 Twenty-six years later the case was dis-
cussed in Straus, where the court concluded that the statement
printed on the buckle was not part of the grounds for decision. 0
More recently, the holding was discussed in Aro Mfg. v. Convertible
Top Replacement Co.,87 in which the Court stated that "the fact
that the ties were marked 'Licensed to use once only,' was deemed of
importance by the Court. 8 8 As in General Talking Pictures, the
80. 1 F. Cas. 623 (C.C.D.R.I., 1878)(No. 293).
81. Cotton Tie, 106 U.S. at 95.
82. The permissible repair doctrine states that the owner of a patented device may
repair it, but may not rebuild it to the extent that it constitutes a reconstruction of the
patented invention.
83. 106 U.S. at 93-94.
84. Id. at 95. This statement suggests that even though the buckle was stamped
with a single-use restriction, it would not be an infringement to reuse it for a purpose
other than baling cotton.
85. Discussion of the restriction printed on the buckle is limited to two sentences:
"On each of the buckles which the corporation has made and put upon the market it has
placed the words 'Licensed to use once only,' stamped into the body of the metal. This
practice was also observed by its predecessor, the copartnership firm." Id. at 91.
86. "That the case was not decided as one of restricted license, because of the
words stamped on the buckle, is shown by the language of Mr. Justice Blatchford in
concluding his opinion" Straus, 210 U.S. at 343.
87. 356 U.S. 336 (1961).
88. Id. at 343 n.9. This ambiguity was an issue in Mallinckrodt as well. The dis-
trict court judge concluded that:
Although footnote number nine in the Aro I opinion states that 'the fact that
the ties were marked 'Licensed to use once only,' was deemed of importance by
the [Cotton Tie] court,' (citation omitted), that footnote should not be leaned
on too hard. . .whatever the implication of footnote nine, the analysis in Cot-
ton Tie rests little if any weight on the license notice.
15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121. In reversing, the circuit court referenced the Aro Mfg.
interpretation approvingly, citing footnote nine in its discussion of the Cotton Tie facts
without further comment. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 707-08.
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Cotton Tie Court managed to avoid relying on a label created servi-
tude capable of binding subsequent purchasers with notice.
Notwithstanding the uneven judicial treatment of the subject, sen-
sible reasons can be found for enforcing some servitudes but not
others. The real questions are whether courts can be expected to dis-
tinguish the good servitudes from the bad, and what new concerns
will arise if a doctrine sympathetic to servitudes is created.
IV. THE CASE FOR A DOCTRINE SUPPORTIVE OF SERVITUDES
Some servitudes can be useful to the intellectual property system
in ways that go beyond providing intellectual property owners with
additional ways to exploit their grant. The following subparts discuss
two types of restrictions - field-of-use and duration - which, if
enforced by the courts as servitudes, would help to reduce the ineffi-
ciencies created by the granting of intellectual property rights.
A. Field-of-Use Restrictions
Field-of-use restrictions can be useful by increasing the availabil-
ity of the patented or copyrighted product. This is demonstrated by
an example of how the patent grant can lead to the underutilization
of useful invention.8 9
Assume that a product incorporating patented invention costs $10
to manufacture, and over the life of the patent grant, the patentee
can expect to sell 1000 units to users who value the product incorpo-
rating the invention at $50. Suppose also that there is a second use
for the invention, again a potential market of 1000 units,-but whose
users value the product at only $15. The patentee will find it more
profitable to sell 1000 units at $50 each to selling 2000 units at $15
each. In this case, the invention will not be purchased for its low
value use. If the patent grant did not exist, competition between pro-
ducers, each able to produce for the $10 manufacturing cost, would
drive the price down until all users who value the invention more
than $10 will buy and use it. The patent grant would restrict the
distribution and use of this invention.
If the patentee can create use restricting servitudes on the pat-
ented products, production of the product would increase to what it
would in a competitive market without patent monopolies. The most
profitable situation for the patentee would be to sell 1000 units at
89. Although the discussion uses patented products for examples, the principles
apply to copyrighted works as well.
$50 each and another 1000 units at $15 each. If the patentee can
prevent resale from the low value market to the high value market at
less than $50, this will be possible. One way to do this would be to
sell use restricted products for $15 into the low value market, and
unrestricted products into the high value market for $50. By making
a use based price structure available, an enforceable servitude of this
sort can increase, not decrease, the distribution and use of the
invention. 90
The servitude at issue in General Talking Pictures is of the field-
of-use type. Western Electric had granted to a manufacturing licen-
see the right to make and sell for private radio reception use, retain-
ing commercial sales for itself. Although the General Talking
Pictures Court did not admit that Western Electric had successfully
created a servitude,91 this type of market segmentation is the kind of
servitude that, under the right conditions, will lead to wider distribu-
tion of the invention.92
90. The previous example is the simplest possible case of perfect market segmenta-
tion. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), afJ'd on
reh'g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938), and Chemagro Corp. v. Universal Chemical Co., 244 F.
Supp. 486 (E.D. Tex. 1965), were similar attempts to discriminate between two largely
separate markets. Under complete market segmentation, monopoly production equals
competitive production. Where total segmentation of markets is not possible, an increase
in production and use is not guaranteed to follow from a restriction that allows this type
of price discrimination. The effect of a specific market segmentation will depend on the
details of the individual demand curves of the markets being segmented. Baxter, supra
note 5, at 367-70. Further, even perfect price discrimination might still result in higher
total social costs because of inordinate investment in attaining and keeping monopolies.
POSNER, supra note 4, at 281-82. Even so, restrictions leading to use-based price discrim-
ination have received considerable support. Martin J. Adelman & Friedrich K. Juenger,
Patent-Antitrust: Patent Dynamics and Field-of-Use Licensing, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 273,
303-04.
The form of the servitude can also alter its distributive effects. The servitude, "this
article may not be used for high value use X," and its converse, "this article may only be
used for low value use Y," are essentially identical if X and Y are the only uses for the
product. The latter servitude, however, has some of the same drawbacks as resale price
fixing. A servitude restricting use to only one specific type will prevent transfer of that
item into a new or previously unforseen higher value market.
91. 304 U.S. at 182, 305 U.S. at 125. A servitude was not created because servi-
tudes, by definition, are effective even after a valid sale passing title of the item subject
to the servitude. General Talking Pictures, by holding that the sale itself infringed the
patents and consequently could not pass title to the defendant, manages to bind the de-
fendant (a third party not involved in the restrictive license contract in any way) without
creation of a servitude on the vacuum tubes. Justice Black's dissent points out the logical
flaws in finding the sale itself an infringement. "Had petitioner - after making the
purchase - decided not to use these amplifiers in the forbidden fields, or had they been
destroyed prior to such use, certainly the mere state of mind of the parties at the time of
sale would not have made them both infringers." 305 U.S. at 131. This problem would
have been avoided had the majority grounded its decision on the theory that the restric-
tive license provision created a servitude on the patented article, enforceable against sub-
sequent purchasers with notice.
92. It has been suggested, however, that the particular facts of the General Talk-
ing Pictures case lead to the conclusion that use-based price discrimination was not the
effect of this particular servitude. Western Electric actually did not sell unrestricted
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The servitude in Chemagro is similar to that in General Talking
Pictures. The home-use and commercial-use discrimination is a
worthwhile field restriction if commercial growers had more availa-
ble alternatives to this particular insecticide, with the result that the
patentee would be required to sell into this market at a lower price
to compete. Without the possibility of creating a servitude,
Chemagro Corp. might have decided to sell only 2% formulations at
a high price into the home market, thereby depriving entirely the
commercial market of a potentially useful product at a competitive
price.
The Waring case has also been seen as an example of a desirable
field-of-use restriction.9" As with General Talking Pictures and
Chemagro, the resulting use-based price discrimination should in-
crease the availability of the copyrighted work to lower value users.
B. Duration Restrictions
Field-of-use restrictions are not the only types of servitudes that
can be justified with analysis of this sort. Duration restrictions can
also be useful, but in a different way.
Assume, as above, that a patentee can produce a product incorpo-
rating the invention for $10 and sell the product for $50. Suppose
further that the unit wears quickly, and after one use requires a $25
repair to use a second time. The buyer will prefer to spend $25 on
the repair, rather than buy a second unit for $50. If the buyer does
this, $15 more will be spent on the additional use than is required,
because a new unit can be built for $10. The buyer is motivated to
spend $25 on repair because $50 is a monopolistic price, created by
the patent grant. In a competitive market, new units would be avail-
able for close to the $10 production cost, and buyers would buy new
products instead of repairing used products. The extra $15 is an inef-
ficiency; it is a social cost that can result from the existence of the
patent grant. A single-use restriction imposed by the patentee can
eliminate this problem. The buyer would be forced to pay $50 for a
tubes into the commercial market. Unrestricted tubes were sold only to Western Elec-
tric's subsidiary, Electrical Research Products, a distributor of talking picture equipment
competing with companies such as General Talking Pictures. In this way, the patent-
based servitude was used to assist in the creation of market power in unpatented end-use
theater equipment. Gerald R. Gibbons, Field Restrictions in Patent Transactions: Eco-
nomic Discrimination and Restraint of Competition, 66 COLuM. L. REV. 423, 448
(1966).
93. Gibbons, supra note 92, at 424-25.
new device, and the $15 waste of resources would be saved.94 In this
situation, enforcement of a duration restriction will not curtail effi-
cient use of the invention, but will increase it. 5
Although the Supreme Court did not rest its holding on these
grounds, the Cotton Tie outcome may be justified in this way. In
Cotton Tie, if straightening and riveting the ties back together was
more costly than creating new ties from scratch, it is sensible to en-
force the "Licensed to use once only" servitude.96
The Mallinckrodt single-use restriction can be seen as analogous
to that in Cotton Tie.97 Many recommendations, instructions, and
use restrictions imposed by manufacturers of medical products in-
volve health and safety concerns. With disposable products and ac-
cessories, there is a constantly shifting trade-off between product
cost, sterilization cost, costs associated with increased infection or
complications from reuse, and disposal costs of the resulting hazard-
ous waste. Maximizing the difference between the benefits of the
products and the costs associated with using them is made more dif-
ficult if the product is covered by patent protection, because the
price of the product is artificially high and is not representative of
the social inputs that went into producing it.99 This problem will be
especially acute in the case of a valuable invention incorporated in a
disposable device, because its high price would motivate buyers of
the product to reuse it, even if that required accepting large steriliza-
tion costs, infection risk, and additional medical complications.
These considerations, as with those involved with expensive repair
or refurbishing efforts, can support a policy of allowing a patent
94. The extra $25 the buyer would need to spend is not a cost in the same sense as
the $15 difference between production and repair cost. This $25 is a transfer of wealth to
the patentee, the transfer intended by the creation of the patent grant. See POSNER,
supra, note 4, at 278. Note, however, that the transfer may still be a source of social
costs, which may ultimately exceed the benefits. Id. at 278-79.
95. It has been noted that it is "not clear how restrictions on use which effectively
bar normal repair and reuse of reusable goods enhance output or maximize wealth for
consumers". James B. Kobak Jr., Contracting Around Exhaustion: Some Thoughts
About the CAFC's Mallinckrodt Decision, 75 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y 550,
555 at Note 16, (July 1993). Although the effects of any specific servitude probably will
not be clear, it is possible to demonstrate that benefits may exist.
Although duration restrictions could be beneficial in preventing wasteful repair ex-
penditures, their enforcement could lead to decreased use of the invention because the
effect of the restriction is to increase the cost to the buyer for each use. Some purchasers
would then decide to purchase cheaper substitutes. Avoiding this would require coupling
a field-of-use restriction on low price units, with a duration restriction on high price
units.
96. Scrap ties, consisting of buckles and cut bands, were sold for 1-1 cents per
pound, new ties were sold at 6 cents per pound. Cotton Tie, 106 U.S. at 92. Repairing
used ties must have cost less than 4- cents per pound, but the production cost of new
ties is unknown.
97. Although Mallinckrodt also characterized its restriction as a field-of-use type
"wherein the field of use is single (i.e. disposable) use." 976 F.2d at 703.
98. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 271-74.
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owner to restrict a patented medical device to single use. If the na-
ture of the use, price, and sterilization of the patented product are
related in this way, then post-initial-use sale at a lower price raises
the same concerns, and enforcement of such a restriction as a servi-
tude can be justified.
V. FEASIBILITY OF ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS FOR THE
ENFORCEMENT OF "INEFFICIENCY MINIMIZING" SERVITUDES
It is apparent that servitude creation and enforcement could be a
useful tool for regulating and minimizing inefficiencies associated
with patents and copyrights. It is also apparent that although some
general conclusions can be drawn concerning what types of use limi-
tations should be enforced as servitudes, the value of any particular
servitude will depend on the details of its provisions and the particu-
lar market for the patented or copyrighted product. One might
therefore suggest a servitude doctrine that only enforces servitudes
minimizing inefficiencies associated with the intellectual property
grant. The difficult question, though, is how to best implement this
doctrine.
One alternative is for Congress to evaluate the economic effects of
various servitudes and modify the patent and copyright statutes to
indicate specifically what types of servitudes are allowable on what
types of products.9 9 The copyright statutes already contain a frame-
work for doing this. Section 106 of the Copyright Act enumerates
99. Mallinckrodt, for instance, would have been an easy case if there was a statute
stating something like: "The use rights obtained by the purchaser of a patented nebulizer
unit do not include the right to sterilize and re-use the unit if the nebulizer unit bears an
inscription stating 'Single Use Only' and the purchaser is aware of the existence of the
inscription at the time of purchase."
the copyright entitlements.100 Section 109 enumerates those entitle-
ments that pass to the purchaser of a copyrighted work.' 0' If the
copyright owner wishes to retain all of the statutorily granted rights,
section 109(d) allows the copyright owner to structure the transfer
as a lease or rental and avoid the forced transfer of the right to resell
contained in section 109(a).
The explicit treatment of this issue, with different rights alloca-
tions for different types of copyrighted works, and with codification
of the sale-vs.-license distinction, has apparently been universally in-
terpreted to prohibit changing the default distribution of rights
through contractual servitude creation. Since the passage of the
1976 Copyright Act, there have been no reported cases of copyright
holders attempting to create servitudes with label notices of the type
discussed in this Comment.10 2
In contrast, the patent statutes grant rights only to patent holders,
but do not state which of these rights pass to purchasers of patented
100. 17 U.S.C. § 106 reads:
Subject to Sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly.
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly. 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 106 (West 1977).
101. Section 109 contains five subsections, (a) through (e), dealing with the trans-
fer upon sale of the rights contained in sections 106(3), § 106(4), and 106(5). The rights
contained in sections 106(1) and 106(2) are always retained by the copyright owner after
the sale of the copyrighted work.
§ 109(a) grants to the purchaser of a copyrighted work the right to resell or "other-
wise dispose of the possession of that copy."
§ 109(b) limits the application of § 109(a) by providing that the right to lease or lend
a copy of a musical work or computer program for commercial gain does not pass to the
purchasers of these particular works.
§ 109(c) grants to purchasers of the products described in § 106(5.) the right to dis-
play the copy publicly.
§ 109(d) allows the copyright owner to retain all of the § 106 rights if the copy is
rented or leased, rather than sold outright.
§ 109(e) grants the purchaser of coin operated video games the rights contained in
§ 106(4), and § 106(5). 17 U.S.C.A. § 109 (West 1977 and Supp. 1993).
102. The only statutorily sanctioned method for retaining additional rights is to
license or lease, rather than sell, the article. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(d) (West 1977 & Supp.
1993). Notwithstanding the extra protection given by section 109(b)(l)(A), discussed
infra note 106, the transfer of a copy of software is often structured as a license or lease,
taking advantage of section 109(d) to avoid the first sale doctrine. See generally Pene-
lope Smith Wilson & Ronald E. Myrick, Licensing Rights to Software, PATENTS, COPY-
RIGHTS. TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, Mar.-Apr.
1993, at 467.
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products. Rights granted to patent holders are enumerated in 35
U.S.C. § 154, which grants to an inventor the exclusive right to
"make, use, and sell" the invention. 103 35 U.S.C. § 261 allows the
patent owner to assign or convey these rights to others for use in
"the whole or any specified part of the United States".104 The patent
statutes contain no analog to 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 109, with their
specific treatment of retained and transferred rights upon the sale of
a copyrighted article. The sale-vs.-license distinction is not explicitly
present in the patent statutory framework, but had been read into it
by the courts.10 5
It would certainly be possible for Congress to sanction specific
types of servitudes and their permissible methods of creation. 06 Un-
fortunately, although perhaps easier to do with copyright than pat-
ent, the detail and scope of statutory material required to implement
a comprehensive solution to the servitude problem makes it clear
that the patent and copyright statutes will never contain laundry lists
of products and associated acceptable or unacceptable restrictions.
Another alternative is to create simplifying presumptions. On the
one hand, patent law could, like copyright, prohibit servitudes en-
tirely. This approach has the virtue of simplicity, but eliminates the
possibility of using servitudes to mitigate market distortions created
by intellectual property grants. On the other hand, all servitudes
could be enforced, regardless of substantive content. This appproach
is also simple, but would allow patent and copyright owners to en-
force restrictions that have already been found to be opposed to
other important principles, such as the antitrust concerns associated
with resale price restrictions. It has been argued that Mallinckrodt
103. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West 1984).
104. 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 1984).
105. This is demonstrated by General Talking Pictures and United States v. Gen-
eral Electric, discussed supra in notes 58, 60-67 and accompanying text.
106. The most recent treatment of audio recordings and computer software is
along these lines. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109 (b)(1)(A) provides that:
Unless authorized by the owners of copyright ... neither the owner of a par-
ticular phonorecord nor any person in possession of a particular copy of a com-
puter program . . . may, for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial
advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of the possession of that pho-
norecord or computer program ... by rental, lease, or lending, or by any act
or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or lending.
This provision prohibits a particular post sale activity for a particular type of copyrighted
work. The effect is to limit, for a specific product, the reach of the doctrine expansively
expressed in cases such as Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339 (1908), and Inde-
pendent News Co. v. Williams, 184 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
is leading patent law in this direction."0 7
As a final alternative, then, it might seem that the middle path of
a servitude doctrine that only enforces servitudes that minimize inef-
ficiencies could be established judicially. Unfortunately, this rule
would require case-by-case litigation over production costs, demand
curves, etc., that could seldom produce a complete and accurate fac-
tual basis to support any reliable conclusion. In addition, it would
provide little guidance to intellectual property owners deciding what
servitudes they may impose in their particular situation.
Fortunately, all is not lost. The establishment of a legal regime
which presumes that single-use restrictions minimize inefficiencies
leads to the correct result. Assume that a patented product can be
produced for $10, can be used a total of ten times before wearing out
completely, with each use requiring a $20 repair, and with each use
valued at $40 by purchasers.
A purchaser will be willing to spend $40 each for single-use-re-
stricted units. Furthermore, taking the cost of repair into account, a
purchaser would be willing to spend $220 on an unrestricted unit,
because the total cost of ten uses would be the $220 purchase price,
plus $180 repair cost, for a total of $400. The patentee will clearly
prefer selling ten use-restricted units for $40 each, netting $300,
than one unrestricted unit for $220, netting $210.
In contrast, if the production cost is $20 and the repair cost is $10,
the purchaser will still be willing to spend $40 each for single-use-
restricted units, but will now be willing to spend $310 on an un-
restricted unit. In this case, the patentee will find it more profitable
to sell an unrestricted unit for $310, netting $290, rather than ten
use-restricted units, netting $200.10 8
107. "Thus, the end result of Mallinckrodt, if its broadest language is taken to its
logical conclusion, would be not only to limit the misuse doctrine but virtually to elimi-
nate any application of either that doctrine or antitrust principles to resale and reuse
restrictions on patented goods." Kobak, supra note 95 at 561-62. Kobak also worries that
"Mallinckrodt will almost surely encourage patentees to impose reuse restrictions, for
through such restrictions patentees may accomplish even more than they could through
tying restrictions. By preventing any right to reuse, a patentee can require that all ancil-
lary items, and even an entire new unit, be purchased from it." Id. at 564. At the time of
this writing, one district court refused to extend the Mallinckrodt holding in this way.
Surgical Laser Technologies v. Surgical Laser Products, 1993 WL 23899 (E.D. Pa.
1993). This case involved a single-use restriction on an unpatented accessory to a pat-
ented medical laser.
108. It could correctly be argued that the sale-vs.-license distinction prevalent in
copyright law leads to exactly the same result. The patentee will weigh the same con-
cerns when deciding whether to license or lease (or perhaps rent) the invention to users,
with a single-use restriction as part of the contract, or simply sell it outright. The servi-
tude approach has advantages, however, because it does not require the user of the prod-
uct to be under contract with the patentee, with all of the attendant transaction costs.
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If the parties to a sale know that the legal regime enforces dura-
tion restrictions, patentees will only be motivated to create restric-
tions that prevent wasteful repair. A court need not analyze the.
details of the production and repair costs of each duration restriction
that comes before it. This observation sheds some light on what may
be the most fruitful method of developing a servitude doctrine.
VI. PATENT SERVITUDE LITIGATION AFTER MALLINCKRODT
After Mallinckrodt, patent servitude litigation can be expected
over two points for which there is no guidance in precedent. The first
is whether the restriction is "within the scope of the patent grant or
otherwise justified." 10 9 The second is whether the purchaser had suf-
ficient notice of the restriction.110 The language of the court indi-
cates that it expects the first requirement to be construed broadly,
allowing a wide range of contractual arrangements to create servi-
tudes."' This may be a fundamentally sound position, because it can
be expected that a wide range of servitudes will be'useful in mini-
mizing monopoly created inefficiency. Furthermore, if the doctrine's
limitations are developed by tight regulation of what constitutes "no-
tice," courts can take advantage of the market's apparent tendency
to create servitudes that reduce monopoly motivated wastes of
resources."1
2
The notice requirements to be developed are important because it
is only when the patentee, the initial purchaser, and subsequent pur-
chasers all have knowledge of the restriction and bargain over its
presence that the market will be effective in regulating what servi-
tudes are created." To help accomplish this, the purchaser should
109. See supra note 19.
110. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying discussion.
I 11. The circuit court in Mallinckrodt defined "within the scope of the patent
grant" as "relat[ing] to subject matter within the scope of the patent claims." 976 F.2d
at 708. A narrow reading of this requirement must not be intended because the district
court pointed out that "[n]either the specifications nor the claims of any of the patents in
suit state that the nebulizer and/or manifold are for single use only or must be disposed
of. Neither do they claim that either the manifold or the nebulizer are clean or disin-
fected." 15 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1114. Since duration restriction enforcement will tend
to prevent wasteful repair, it is sensible to consider these types of restrictions as being
"within the scope of the patent grant."
112. Perhaps servitudes "within the patent grant or otherwise justified" should be
interpreted as meaning those servitudes which market forces tend to create only when
they reduce waste or inefficiency associated with the patent monopoly. Duration restric-
tions apparently have this character, but it may not be true of other types.
113. The sufficiency of notice was not addressed by the Mallinckrodt court, but
was to be determined on remand. As the case was settled soon after the circuit decision
be required to have notice of both the restriction, and of the paten-
tee's intention to enforce the restriction with infringement actions.
Also, the user should have notice of specifically defined prohibited
uses. Servitudes that attempt to reserve the right to declare at a fu-
ture date what uses are prohibited should not be enforced. The re-
striction should be shown to have been part of the bargain in the
purchase of the device, whether the purchaser is the original pur-
chaser from the patentee or a subsequent purchaser." 4
With Mallinckrodt, the Federal Circuit has started down an un-
certain path. Whether or not the benefits of avoiding some types of
monopoly-motivated waste will be worth the judicial effort to create
a servitude doctrine largely from scratch remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
Intellectual property grants, though creating incentives for innova-
tive activity, also create incentives for inefficient behavior. The mo-
nopoly price will motivate some potential users of the invention to
prefer more costly, but lower price, substitutes. In addition, the mo-
nopoly price can motivate users to incur socially wasteful costs asso-
ciated with prolonging the useful life of a product incorporating the
invention. These costs may involve direct expenditures to repair or
refurbish the item, or they may be indirect costs, such as injuries,
associated with extended use. Construing the intellectual property
grant to include the ability to create servitudes on products incorpo-
rating the invention can reduce the costs that are associated with the
patent and copyright monopolies, although a doctrine sympathetic to
servitude creation requires investigation into how to decide what ser-
vitudes are appropriate and when to consider a purchaser as having
sufficient notice of the restriction.
Now that the Federal Circuit has taken such a step in the patent
arena, and indicated little limitation on restrictions it will consider
appropriate for servitude status, the requirements for notice should
be crafted to ensure that the restriction imposed is clearly part of the
sale bargain. This will prevent unjust surprise on the part of pur-
chasers, and also limit post sale determinations by patentees of what
constitutes simply instructions or suggestions for use, and what use
came down, this issue remains undecided. Kobak, supra note 95 at 554.
114. Being part of a sale bargain is not intended to be synonymous with being part
of a sale contract. As indicated supra, in note 108, servitudes have advantages over leases
and licenses only to the extent that the intellectual property owner is relieved from the
need to bind all future users of the item by contract.
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rights are intended to be retained as property rights, enforceable
through infringement actions.
THOMAS ARNO

